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Abstract: The use of Internet-connected devices at homes has increased to monitor energy
consumption. Furthermore, renewable energy sources have also increased, reducing electricity
bills. However, the high cost of the equipment limits the use of these technologies. This paper
presents a low-cost secured-distributed Internet of Things (IoT) system to monitor and control
devices connected in a polygeneration microgrid, as a combined power system for local loads with
renewable sources. The proposed mechanism includes a Wireless Sensor Actuator Networked Control
System that links network nodes using the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. The Internet communication
enables the monitor and control of devices using a mobile application to increase the efficiency.
In addition, security mechanisms are implemented at several levels including the authentication,
encryption, and decryption of the transmitted data. Furthermore, a firewall and a network intrusion
detection-and-prevention program are implemented to increase the system protection against
cyber-attack. The feasibility of the proposed solution was demonstrated using a DC microgrid
test bench consisting of a diverse range of renewable energy sources and loads.
Keywords: IoT; cyber-physical system; renewable energy; microgrid; polygeneration
1. Introduction
According to the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), over $370 billion has
been spent annually in recent years on electricity generation. Roughly 48% ($177.6 billion) of the total
generation was spent in the residential sector [1]. To increase the efficiency in energy consumption,
data acquisition equipment such as smart meters, smart plugs, and many other sensors are commonly
used. Although Home Energy Management System (HEMS) are anticipated as one of the promising
technologies to fulfill the demand for energy saving, thus far it has only had limited implementation
because the high initial equipment cost [2] and the lack of optimal managing software because the
power consumption pattern of residence is too diverse to find an optimal power management for each
home [3]. A HEMS works by placing sensors at different appliances and/or devices that reads their
energy consumption. By scheduling major household appliances, residents can reduce their electricity
bills [4–6]. In several cases, the sensors are connected to the Internet reporting the data to the owner.
The extension of the Internet connectivity into physical devices is named the Internet of Things (IoT),
defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) as a network of items embedded
with sensors that are connected to the Internet [7].
Monitoring applications can provide valuable information about your home from the actual status
to a detailed history. This technology can provide the services, information, communication, and data
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analysis anytime, as long there is a connection to the Internet, to tackle the energy consumption
along with augmentation of the modern home living experience [8–10]. In addition, the integration
of renewable energy sources (RESs) in distributed generation (DG), with proper control systems,
have proven a lower electric bills in the residential sector [11]. In addition, the usage of RESs reduces
carbon dioxide emissions by 1925 million metric tons in 2015, or roughly 36.5% of the total of all
sectors in the United States [12]. However, the integration of RESs presents challenges in power
quality, cost, power availability, location of RESs resource, and power forecast, among others [12].
Therefore, the integration of an IoT monitoring systems would improves the network performance to
make a more resilient and efficient cyber-physical system. Since this environment is connected to the
Internet, it needs to be protected from security threats. As shown in [13], the scheme has to fulfill three
requirements:
1. Confidentiality concerns the protection of data, such that only approved users can access the data.
2. Authentication means checking that the data have not been altered and that the data can be
confirmed by the claimed author to have been sent.
3. Access refers to only allowing suitably authorized users to access data, communications network,
and computing resources and ensuring that those authorized users are not prevented from
such access.
This paper presents a cyber-physical system consisting of a low-cost secure IoT mechanism
for monitoring and controlling appliances/devices connected in a polygeneration microgrid.
The hardware of the system was implemented using low-cost commercial off-the-shelf items, while the
software was developed using free and open source resources. The IoT control scheme is comprised of a
Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networked Control System (WSANCS) which implements a star topology
with one sink node (S-N) and a set of sensor-actuator nodes (SA-N). The sensor-actuator nodes are
an embedded entity composed of a micro-controller, a communication device, and a current/voltage
sensor. The sink node is an embedded entity comprised of a micro-controller, a communication
device, and a micro-computer. The data gathered by the WSANCS are sent to a cloud database.
In addition, a mobile application allows the user to monitor and control the system in real-time.
This mobile application retrieves the data from the database through the encrypted Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol, providing to the system both the energy production and consumption. Finally,
the mobile application allows the user to control all the registered electric appliances as well, and,
according to the literature, these smart homes applications might achieve around 8% reduction in
energy consumption [14,15]. Therefore, the use of these approaches in RES grids might represent
a considerable improve in energy efficiency since the energy availability and storage are the bigger
constraints in polygeneration microgrids.
This manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 presents
the system architecture including the WSANCS architecture and details of the IoT secure architecture.
Simulation results and security analysis are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents a
summary and future work.
2. Related Work
A microgrid is a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within
a defined electrical boundaries [16]. Traditionally, microgrids have been used in remote areas
without access to main power grids and can employ various communication technologies to data
sharing. In addition, the governments in the U.S., the Asia Pacific region, and the European Union
have established supporting policies, demonstration projects, control systems research, and the
development of software tools for microgrids. For instance, The U.S. federal government provides
investment tax incentives for customers installing microgrid technologies. The incentives cover a
wide range of technologies including solar photovoltaics, combined heat and power, and electric
vehicles. Some states provide incentive for microgrid projects to supply individual customers
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or critical loads such as hospitals, first responders, and water treatment facilities, after natural
disasters such as Hurricane Sandy [17]. However, given the intermittency and variability of RES,
microgrid customers need mechanisms for controlling power demand depending on power availability.
Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy has identified several core areas for microgrid controls:
(1) frequency control; (2) volt/volt-ampere-reactive control; (3) grid-connected-to-islanding transition;
(4) islanding-to-grid-connected transition; (5) energy management; (6) protection; (7) ancillary service;
(8) black start; and (9) user interface and data management [18].
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are used in area monitoring, threat detection, the domestic sector,
health care sector, environmental sector, industrial sector, and the primary sector. A WSN is defined
as a self-configured and infrastructure-less wireless network of spatially dispersed sensors dedicated
to monitoring and recording physical conditions of the environment [19]. A WSN can have a few to
even thousands of nodes, where each node is connected to one or many sensor nodes to cooperatively
pass their data across the network to a main location (usually a data center). Each sensor node is
typically composed of a radio transceiver with an internal or external antenna, a micro-controller,
an electronic circuit interfacing with the sensors and an energy source. WSNs topologies can vary
from a simple star topology to a multi-hop wireless mesh topology [20]. Size and cost constraints on
sensor nodes result in corresponding constraints on resources such as energy, memory, computational
speed, and communications bandwidth. Moreover, a WSANCS is composed of a group of distributed
sensors and actuators that communicate through wireless link which achieves distributed sensing and
executing tasks [21]. This latter scheme allows the distributed control of devices that are spread in a
wide area without physical connections between them such as a polygeneration distributed system
with several renewable energy sources.
A WSANCS connected to the Internet becomes an IoT system. Coelho [22] illustrated the
integration of the IoT for monitoring tasks in the office sector. They showed the convenience of having
a monitoring system for conserving energy. A similar application was implemented by Patchava [23],
who demonstrated the potentiality of having a smart home monitoring system. However, the use of
this communication technology puts at risks the security and privacy of the data. IoT uses the Internet,
thus carrying its vulnerabilities. These systems are vulnerable to diverse types of attacks such as denial
of services, packet sniffing, and session hijacking to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the system, both damaging the system and putting the user to a possible personal risk [24,25]. In [26],
Rawlinson described that 70% of the most popular IoT devices have vulnerabilities. Additionally,
more than 25 vulnerabilities per device were discovered on average, with a total of 250 security
concerns across all products tested. Furthermore, some devices had unsafe user interfaces and/or
insecure firmware. Consequently, IoT devices need an efficient and effective protection scheme.
3. The Proposed System Architecture
This section presents the IoT WSANCS architecture implemented in a DC microgrid. The IoT
security protection scheme is also introduced.
3.1. The IoT WSANCS Architecture
Figure 1 presents the updated system architecture introduced in [27]. The system consists of two
RESs including a micro-wind turbine and a photovoltaic system (PV Array), both with their respective
charge controller. It is worth noting that the architecture allows the system to increase the number
of RESs as needed. The produced energy is stored in a battery bank. In addition, an inverter and a
DC-to-DC converter are required to supply the loads. The WSANCS is composed by two types of
nodes: the sensor-actuator nodes (SA-N) and the sink node (S-N).
The SA-N are included in every load of the system while the S-N is responsible for receiving
the sensed data, process them, and control the network by sending wireless-control signals to the
SA-N. The current and voltage are measured at different points in the microgrid using the SA-N. XBee
modules are included in the WSANCS for wireless transmission purposes. Switches are connected to
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the Arduino micro-controller to control the loads (turn-on/turn-off) through a digital signal. The SA-N
architecture (seen in Figure 2) is composed of a current sensor, an Arduino micro-controller, and a
XBee Pro module as end device using the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol [28] to monitor the grid generation
and consumption. A voltage sensor is also included to measure the quality of voltage levels at different
points in the microgrid.
Figure 1. System architecture.
Figure 2. Sensor-actuator node architecture.
The S-N architecture (see Figure 3) includes the XBee coordinator connected to the Arduino 2
MEGA microprocessor for reading the signal of all the sensor nodes, making the necessary calculations,
and printing those values to the corresponding serial port. A Raspberry-PI3 B+ (RPI3+) computer
collects these values using a Python script to store data in both local and cloud databases using Sqlite3
and Firestore, respectively. This information is accessible for the user through the Android mobile
application explained in detail in Section 3.2.3. In addition, the user can send the command to switch
the state of the loads connected in the microgrid test bench through the mobile application, and then
the S-N will send the signal to the corresponding SA-N to achieve what the user desires.
Since there are different XBees frequently attempting communication, the implemented module
includes an acknowledgment scheme that allows the user to verify if data were received and from
which device. The system was designed as a centralized coordinator-end device system with a
coordinator XBee in the S-N that receives data from the SA-N and delivers them to a RPI3+.
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Figure 3. Sink node architecture.
3.1.1. Range and Operation Modes
The maximum distance to transmit data between two XBees was around 60 feet (18.3 m),
taking into consideration concrete walls. The XBee’s radio modules require 3.3 V with a power-down
current < 10 µA, a transmit (TX) current of 45 mA, and a receive (RX) current of 50 mA. A consumption
of less than 50 µA is expected in sleep mode operation; in this mode, for 1 min, the micro-controller
keeps receiving information from the current or voltage sensors. Then, when the XBee wakes up,
the acquired power consumption is sent to the sink node.
3.1.2. Network Topology
The WSANCS is implemented using a start topology because of its improved ability to contain
errors and their tolerance to proximity and common-mode failures [29–33]. A quantitative comparison
of the error-containment capabilities was presented by Barranco [34]. In the proposed topology,
each SA-N has a XBee end-device used to connect it to the S-N which has the XBee coordinator.
The XBee technology defines a point-to-point (PTP) connection between a coordinator and an end
device. The coordinator receives a signal from any SA-N and can route them to the other SA-N.
The S-N works as a server and it controls and manages entire function of the network. Some of the
advantage of using this topology are:
1. It is easy to locate problems because if an end device fails, it affects only one sensor node.
2. It is easy to extend the network without disturbing the entire WSANCS.
3. It is easy to identify faultS and remove nodes in the WSANCS.
4. It provides very high speed of data transfer.
In addition, the S-N is connected to Internet through the RPI3+. This connection allows the system
to send and received data to the user’s mobile application as well as to upload the sensed data to a
cloud database.
3.2. The IoT Security Protection Scheme
Khan in [35] described that the structure of IoT is divided into three main layers: (1) perception;
(2) network; and (3) application. The large quantities of data generated by IoT devices, and their
sensitive nature, make the IoT a prime target for cyber-attacks [36]. For this reason, the transmitted
data are encrypted and authenticated using different protocols to secure the IoT layers [37].
Figure 4 presents the proposed protection for each IoT Layer. In the figure, red is assigned for the
WSANCS nodes, blue for protocols, violet for intrusion detection systems, clear blue for databases,
green for mobile applications, and orange for authentication measures. The implemented tools for
every layer are explained below.
3.2.1. The Perception Layer
The perception layer is similar to the facial skin and five sense organs of the IoT, i.e., it mainly
identifies objects and gathering information [38]. In this work, the perception layer is composed
of WSANCS mentioned in Section 3.1. To assure data are traveling between the SA-N and the S-N,
the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol authenticates the received message with the Media Access Control (MAC)
address of the end devices.
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Figure 4. Proposed IoT security protection scheme.
3.2.2. The Network Layer
The network layer is for transmitting and processing data [38]. The network layer in this
system includes the S-N. This node receives, processes, decrypts/encrypts data from/to the SA-N,
and decrypts/encrypts data from/to the cloud-based database Firestore using the TLS protocol.
The major security threat is related to the access to the Internet. The Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW)
is used to protect the RPI3+ against cyber-attacks, monitor network traffic, and block unauthorized
traffic according to a defined set of security rules. Fail2Ban is used for intrusion prevention;
this framework protects the S-N against brute force attacks and tracks the log files generated in
order to detect malicious activity. Similarly, it can inform and update the firewall to avoid further
suspicious IP login attempts. OpenSSH is used for providing a secured remote login connection to
the RPI3+. This encrypts all traffic (including passwords) in order to prevent spying, hijacking, and
other attacks, providing a secure network channel through a client–server architecture. The remote
login is implemented using the key-based authentication standard where every authorized user must
generate a key and encrypt the key with a passphrase to log on the computer. Finally, the passphrase
is implemented in order to protect the user key in case a hacker takes control of the user computer and
tries to log into the RPI3+ using the generated key.
3.2.3. The Application Layer
The application layer provides global management of the application based on the object’s
information processed in the database [35]. This layer is composed of a monitoring mobile application
for Android. The security of this layer comes from all the security implemented in the perception and
network layers and the authentication that is implemented in the mobile application to certify that is
the user who is accessing the data and not an intruder. The application has a two-step authentication
procedure to register a new user and a fingerprint authentication to log-in this user; both dashboards
are shown in Section 4 of this paper.
Therefore, a home energy management mobile application for Android is developed.
This application retrieves the consumption and generation data from the cloud database which allows
the user to track their energy consumption and generation, providing information for scheduling some
activities might demand more energy (e.g., use the washing machine when the PV and turbine are
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generating more energy). A listener is implemented to refresh the consumption/generation graphs in
real-time. In addition, the application lists all the monitored equipment with the option to be switched
on and off to avoid energy waste when are being left on and nobody is at home. The user has the
option to delete or register a new device by providing basic information about it as well. In addition,
the application lists all the monitored equipment with the option to be switched on and off to avoid
energy waste when they are left on and nobody is at home.
For security purposes, a two-step sign up verification was implemented with the user cell-phone
number. After the sign up, the user has the option to log-in using his fingerprint if desired. Both features
are explained in detailed in Section 4.4.1. The application dashboard and some capabilities are shown
in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Mobile application capabilities.
Figure 6 shows the application interface listing the devices that the user has registered.
The required information to register a new device is presented as well. A threshold value to be
aware of an excess of power consumption could be included in order to turn-off the device when the
power consumption reaches such threshold.
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Figure 6. Some equipment options.
4. Results and Discussion
This section provides the simulation results and security analysis implemented in the DC
microgrid test bench used as a test platform.
4.1. Microgrid Test-Bed
The proposed system was tested using the updated configuration of a DC microgrid test bench
introduced in [27]. The test bed microgrid consists of two RESs including a 400 W micro-wind turbine
and a 400 W PV system, each with its respective charge controller. The generated energy is stored in a
12 V deep-cycle battery bank. A 400 W inverter and a DC-to-DC converter were required to supply the
loads. Arduino off-the-shelf modules are used to measure currents and voltages at different points in
the microgrid, as presented in Figure 1. The WSANCS communication was implemented using the
XBee modules. The mosfet switches are connected to the Arduino micro-controller to control the load
state (turn-on or turn-off) through a digital signal, as shown in Section 3.
4.2. WSANCS Simulation
The Riverbed Modeler Academic Edition was selected to simulate the data transfer protocol used
by the XBees. The simulation used the ZigBee protocol based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, and
the data link layer worked with the same standard. The star topology presented in Section 3.2.2 was
implemented.
To assure that the bidirectional data transfer is between the S-N and the SA-N, two SA-N were
simulated. Figure 7 shows the model implemented were the node_0 is the coordinator and the other
two nodes are end devices. The results demonstrate that the protocol can send 120 package in 1 min
between these three nodes. A total of 1–60 package per minute is estimated for the desired application,
which validates that protocol has the transfer capacity required.
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Figure 7. Communication simulation.
4.3. WSANCS Implementation
In a survey conducted by Lim [39], they found that 68.75% of 35 survey respondents occasionally
forget to switch off unused appliances while 6.25% of the respondents tend to forget frequently.
Besides that, it is also noted that 48.57% (17 respondents) of survey takers find it troublesome to
walk to the switch to turn off an appliance, hence 35.29% of the above 17 respondents often leave
the appliance turned on. To mitigate this waste of energy, a script was written with a listener to
the Firestore database to perform real-time changes in the microgrid through the mobile application.
The desired switch state can be uploaded by the user from the application to the cloud database. Then,
the listener in the S-N uploads and downloads these changes. Section 3.1.1 mentions that the SA-N
only wakes up every 1 min to send data. However, the S-N is able to send an interrupt signal to the
SA-N to switch the state of the desired device instantly, after a user requested.
4.4. Security Protection Analysis
4.4.1. Two-Step Verification and Fingerprint
Figure 8 presents the login interface of the mobile application. To achieve a higher level of
security, the application contains a two-step verification process to create the user account. In this
case, the two-step verification is implemented using the user phone number. Then, the user needs
to enter the code that was sent by SMS. The authentication process is using SHA-256 to encrypt and
authenticate such process. Log-in via fingerprint capability is available for better security if desired.
A reset password interface is included as well. An email with detailed procedure will be received after
a request.
Figure 8. Login interface.
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4.4.2. Brute Force Attacks
The penetration test was conducted with the Metasploit software that it is owned by Boston,
Massachusetts-based security company Rapid7 [40]. The exploit was successful the first time in
the insecure environment, which also has a Secure Shell (SSH) for secure remote login (SRL) but
with a common password (e.g., abcdefg). This exploit provides the attacker with access to device
management, as shown in Figure 9. There is a constant loop that the hacker can have access all the
time. The SSH-key based protocol was used to secure the RPI3+ running Raspbian operating system.
However, SSH-key-based protocol does not guarantee that the system will be resistant to such attacks
but only those with the key and passphrase will be able to log-in and execute the exploits.
Figure 9. Pen-Test in vulnerable environment.
In addition, another attack was successfully performed because the user inserted the same
general passphrase to encrypt the key. Taking into consideration this situation, the Fail2Ban and UFW
installation settings were modified as well as the default rules. In addition, the key’s passphrase was
changed with numbers and special characters for the strongest one with more than 16 characters. Now,
the exploit was run again, but the key’s passphrase was hard to guess and after five tries Fail2Ban
banned the IP address updating its Firewall’s IP-Tables for an unlimited period. This procedure is
shown in Figure 10. Then, the host files were modified for allowing only the IP address from the
authorized users in the system. Thus, only registered user IP address can target and break the machine.
Figure 10. Pen-Test in the proposed scheme.
4.4.3. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) [41] was the mechanism used to strike the RPI3+. One of the
DoS attacks requests 530,020 to the server from which 1239 failed in vulnerable environment. A high
number in the failed parameter means that the server goes down and does not respond. To mitigate
this attack, modifications in the host (.allow and .deny) files and Fail2Ban (.local) rules were made.
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 8354 11 of 14
After those changes, a total of 44,045 requests were made to the server by the first attack, and only
10 failed. In addition, the request to the server stops when the failed goes to 10 because the Fail2Ban
detects and bans the invalid IP address. Then, another threat was carried out, since the Fail2Ban had
blocked the IP address, 0 requests were processed and 0 failed, as shown in Figure 11. This indicates
the IP address is blocked and can no longer attack or attempt to access the RPI3+.
Figure 11. DoS stopped.
The calculated failure rate of our system after some runs of DoS attacks in the vulnerable
environment was 0.20% but the CPU was working at 100%. In the case of DDoS attacks, the system can






where F is the failed parameter and R is the requested parameter of the LOIC software.
5. Summary and Future Work
This paper presented a low-cost, secure IoT mechanism for monitoring and controlling
appliances/devices in a microgrid with renewable energy sources. The integration of a WSANCS
to the microgrid provides real-time access to each device connected to the system for monitoring
and control purposes. In addition, a mobile application allows the user to visualize real time power
consumption/generation data with a graphical user interface. As soon one of the categories is selected,
a graph of the desired measurement is refreshed with the latest desired data, providing updated results.
The application alerts the user when a device reaches a power consumption threshold defined by the user.
A control and security analysis was conducted to establish the feasibility of the proposed system.
The results demonstrate the systems capabilities in a DC microgrid test bench. Brute force and denial
of service attacks were mitigated involving free and open-source software mechanisms in the network
layer of the IoT implementation.
Future work includes the increasing the microgrid size and developing an iOS version app to reach
more users. In addition, the system can be improved through the use of machine learning algorithms
to detect anomalies in the system or a turned-on device without human interaction based on previous
data [42].
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The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
CAN Controller Area Network
DC Direct Current
DG Distributed Generation
MPPT Maximum Power Point Tracking
HEMS Home Energy Monitoring System
IoT Internet of Things
MAC Media Access Control
PTP Point-to-Point
RESs Renewable Energy Sources
RPI3+ Raspberry Pi 3 B+
SA-N Sensor-Actuator Nodes
S-N Sink Node
TLS Transport Layer Security
UFW Uncomplicated Firewall
WSANCS Wireless sensor and Actuator Networked Control System
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
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